Phil Solomon, Author at ByDanJohnson.com

Flying Clubs as Another Route to Affordable Aviation

By Phil Solomon || September 19, 2024 Leave a Comment (Edit)

(Photo: AOPA)

In the previous article, I explained how high levels of flight activity can make access more affordable and, for most people, how that would likely be achieved only through some form of shared ownership/use. The use of the term “shared ownership/use” is deliberate because not everybody really wants or feels the need to “own” something they use but, perhaps, believes that there is no other realistic or safe alternative. This article is based on a close examination of the reasons people give for not being open to any form of sharing and looking at how those barriers might be removed. It will also try to address the second, less discussed, part of affordability, which is “accessibility” to shared use aircraft. There is little benefit to being able to afford what does not, essentially, exist. A good, but somewhat parallel, example of this has been the original iteration of Light Sport Aircraft and Sport Pilot Licenses. Both had huge potential to improve affordability of learning to fly and then being able to continue afterwards, but, widespread accessibility and, dare I say it, acceptability, was never achieved. My article on MOSAIC, referenced this so I am not going to repeat that here, other than to say that if, as hoped, we see a substantial growth in the makes and models of models designed under the new standards allowed by MOSAIC, they could be the perfect conduit for the type of expansion of accessibility, safety, technology and affordability people are seeking. When it comes to shared ownership/use, both AOPA (Flying Clubs - You Can Fly) and EAA (Flying Club Resource Center) offer great resources on how to find, set-up and manage flight clubs, partnerships etc. Indeed, using their guides and explanations should be very high on everybody’s list of first steps when it comes to exploring these options. Looking at the different clubs out there, it becomes clear that there is a wide variety of purposes and motivations behind each of them. Sometimes it springs from an individual who has a plane and simply wants to spread out the costs of operation with a few new friends and other times it involves clubs that have professional management, decades of experience and tens of planes available to hundreds of members. The point being, that while the mechanisms to create and manage clubs is very well covered by AOPA and EAA there is really no coordination at state, regional or national levels so the net result is a somewhat random.

Cade Halle, the Manager of AOPA’s Flying Clubs Initiative, kindly shared some information on their progress. “Currently AOPA recognizes 1112 registered clubs of which 254 were formed directly with AOPA’s assistance and are recognized as ‘AOPA Network Clubs’ (clubs that adhere to FAA regulations on the proper way of operating a flying club). At any given time, we are working roughly 50 leads of newly forming clubs in various stages of formation. In terms of rate of growth, it’s really quite cyclical as with anything in aviation, but there is no shortage of people interested in joining or forming a club. In 2023, 178 clubs responded to our annual survey. Of those that responded, the average club size was 32 members with an average of 2 aircraft per club. Those numbers are pretty on par with the last 4 years. Single engine piston, fixed gear makes up 92% of all club aircraft. The oldest flying club in the US is the Clemson Flying Club formed in 1927. Lots of clubs started in the 50’s and 60’s that are still going today. I don’t have any specific data for each state, but Texas, California, and Florida are the top 3 states with the most clubs based on numbers I could go through.” The EAA, via Timm Bogenhagen, Member Programs Specialist, reports about 100 clubs with many of them near to EAA Chapters. They do not have hard statistics for members and numbers of aircraft but estimate one to two aircraft per club and 20-30 members per club. Without solid statistics, we have to resort to making assumptions. It is probable, if not provable, that between AOPA and EAA they have captured at least 50% of all the shared ownership/use groups in the USA. Their combined total comes to about 1200 groups, so, if we double that based on the percentage of clubs linked to one or both organizations, we get to approximately 2400 groups with an average of two planes per group so, perhaps 4800 aircraft in some form of shared use excluding flight schools. Based on the 2022 FAA GA survey data, that would suggest that less than 4% of the aircraft designated as “Personal” (141,600) in the survey are in any form of shared use. Consequently, given the average hours per aircraft flown of 58 quoted in the first part of this article, it would not be a stretch to conclude that the overwhelming majority of personal planes are not providing their owners with cost efficient flying.

What emerges from AOPA, EAA and personal experience, is that there is an unquantified, and unsatisfied demand at some level, for access to affordable aircraft. How much of that pent-up demand comes from frustration at the lack of any, or decent, rental aircraft in their local area, is also unclear. With the very large increase in demand for flight training, the availability of aircraft for other purposes is potentially more constrained than it has ever been as the same aircraft are in demand for shared ownership/use as those being used in flight schools. Well established, and geographically limited clubs confirm emphatically both the favorable economics of sharing through volume but, with such limited penetration, clearly have not established a universally winning model of success. AOPA and EAA have contributed valuable insights and assistance to already motivated people on how to create and run such clubs, but widespread adoption has possibly been held back by the lack of a “for profit” business model. Owning and operating high volume aircraft requires investment, infrastructure, management, experience and continuity that often goes beyond the realm of voluntary organizations. The profit motive may well be what is needed to take shared ownership to the next level but, entrepreneurs and their money like to see clearly defined markets with standards that can be met. At the present time there is neither a clearly defined market nor a clearly defined path to reach customers.

What role does standardization play?

In the first article, the emphasis was on making the case for how effective high volume of activity is in bringing down costs. However, there are clearly other factors that should also be considered when trying to create a sustainable business model. Possibly, the most important of those factors is the choice of aircraft. Current shared ownership/use aircraft likely encompass a very wide range of makes and models, ages, condition, capabilities and installed equipment. The beauty of this is that pilots can, at least in theory, align their desires and budgets with specific local options. A key practical downside is that the “dating process” between pilots and available options means that few “marriages” actually result for a variety of reasons. This takes us to the thorny question of whether trying to create a standardized offering (i.e., combination of aircraft and access to those aircraft) could open up opportunities, or simply lead to more disagreements over personal preferences. The balance of the discussion here will be that, in addition to volume and a profit motive, creating a standardized offering is essential if progress is to be made. The combination of all these three factors would go a very long way toward removing the barriers of acceptability that can be cited as reasons not to share, and that were explored in the first article. By not having a defined standard for aircraft or how the planes are managed, prospective users/owners are faced with having to make a wide range of decisions without necessarily having the skills or experience to sort through them meaningfully. This complexity and the high risk of making a “bad” choice undoubtedly has some effect on whether people even start on the process, let alone, complete it. This is where MOSAIC comes into the equation because it is an entirely standards-based process when it comes to the proposed new Light Sport definitions covering both aircraft and Sport Pilot privileges. Additionally, it opens up the option for four-seat planes to everyone including Sport Pilots and allows manufacturers to use the ATSM's standards to bring down their costs and adopt new technology. Taking this to its next logical step would be to have a standard for shared ownership/use aircraft that clubs, or entrepreneurs, could operate to. For example, one such offering might be presented as follows with a goal of covering as many prospective needs as possible.

The challenge with all of the above is that it does not really provide a clear path forward or even a vision as to what might be. A possible description of how the future could look is presented below as a catalyst to generate ideas and not as an exact prescription for success. So, lets dream and look five to 10 years into the future:

The final version of MOSAIC has been implemented and this has generated a wide variety of new models being offered into the market at significantly lower price points than the legacy and semi legacy companies of today. They take maximum advantage of the standards based processes and benefit from avionics and engines that meet those standards.
Local, regional and national entities have signed up to a franchise model offering only one make and model of shared use plane enabling a chosen manufacturer to produce large volumes efficiently and cost effectively. This has flow through effects on all the suppliers who can also benefit from longer product runs and improved component reliability.\
There are four parts to the distribution chain:
- The provider who rents/manages the shared use fleets. They access the aircraft via leases rather than direct purchases. They follow a standard model for management of the aircraft, insurance protocols, currency of users, scheduling, maintenance etc using a franchise type process.
- Leasing companies buy the aircraft from the manufacturer and lease them to the providers. Their key role is to try and balance the supply of aircraft with demand and work directly with the chosen manufacturer on support, spare parts etc.
- Individual or corporate investors lend to and/or invest in the leasing companies but do not take any active management role. The only difference between these investors and others is that they have explicitly bought into and support the concept on a macro level rather than seeing each aircraft purchase as a new investment. This creates a far more fluid and cost-effective process by cutting down on duplicative bureaucracy.
- The aircraft manufacturer has committed to a standard product and very competitive pricing knowing that they can expect certain volumes of aircraft on an ongoing basis.
Flights schools have also bought into the concept of an affordable standard product for their training operations making the transition for graduating students into the shared use fleet seamless.
Pilots can sign up at the local level and be approved to use the standard aircraft model with varying levels of commitment while benefiting from lower prices than traditional rental options and no administrative or ownership burdens. In many cases their provider would also be the local flight school or FBO. Being well equipped, professionally managed and full of technology has gone a long way towards the removal of many barriers to people’s willingness to share.
Average flight hours per active aircraft are up twenty-fold contributing both to more affordable flying while offering everyone in the chain a good profit potential.
More pilots are active and current which, when combined with access to modern aircraft, has created a far safer operating environment for all.
The planes remaining in personal ownership tend to be more specialist and higher end.

In summary, bringing costs down to “affordable” levels depends on finding ways to scale up hours flown per aircraft, accepting the concept of a standard product and being open to using planes that are professionally managed, maintained and owned by others. Some, but not all, of the elements needed to make this a reality already exist. The biggest challenge will be to convince people that it is possible to reshape the way access to planes is managed. Trying to reverse the trend of increasingly expensive planes that leave the majority of pilots scrabbling for 50 year old hand-me-downs is not going to happen without disturbing a lot of established industry customs and practices, so will likely face stiff opposition.

Shared Ownership — A Route To “Affordable Aviation”

By Phil Solomon || September 4, 2024 1 Comment (Edit)

How the Numbers Add Up

Affordability is really not a single quantifiable number that can be used to judge a product. There are simply too many other factors such as income, lifestyle and geographical location that have to be taken into account while, of course, no two people see their life priorities the same way. How that product is accessed will also have a significant effect on its affordability. The simplest examples being the purchase of a house or a new car. If they all had to be paid for in cash, there would be very limited home or car ownership. In these examples, the ability to spread the purchase cost over an extended period of time makes an unaffordable/inaccessible item affordable. To some extent this would be true for a plane but, for most people, a house or car are considered essential while a plane is typically seen as a luxury so access to loans to buy them are somewhat restricted and expensive due to the relatively small market. Trying to determine what it costs for an average person to own a plane is challenging for a number of reasons including the value of the plane, where it is located, the financial situation of the owner and how many hours it will actually be flown in a year. The FAA produces an annual general aviation survey, the most recent one being for 2022. Using the total number of hours flown and categorized as “personal” (8.2 million hours) divided by the number of planes categorized as “personal” (141,600) we get a figure of just under 58 hours per year per plane. Personal planes and hours include rotorcraft and fixed wing single and multi-engine. Another part of the survey indicates single engine piston planes fly less hours per year on average than both multi engine planes and rotorcraft, so the 58 hours average is probably an overstatement, but we will use it here for convenience.

What About Costs?

Table 1

Here, we really have to make some assumptions, so these are mine based on 34 years of ownership, operation, aircraft management, from multiple FBOs and flight schools in Virginia and Florida. Two types of cost are used when creating a forecast, fixed and variable. A fixed cost is one that is not usually going to change irrespective of the hours flown, a good example being insurance. A variable cost is one that is going to apply to every hour flown, a good example being fuel. Some variable costs cover future expenses such as an engine overhaul and are not cash being spent every year but is money you have to put to one side to save up for the eventual expense. These are called reserves. Aircraft ownership comes with a very heavy dose of fixed costs. Total annual cost of ownership is the addition of fixed plus variable costs. The cost per hour of flight is the total annual cost divided by the hours flown.

Table 2

In our example we are going to look at a plane that cost $80,000, was purchased with a 20 year loan at 7% annual interest. The detailed numbers are in three tables at the end of the article. I will just provide a simple summary here, so as to maintain simplicity. In our example: Fixed costs per year (Table 1): $19,056 (hangared) or $15,456 (tied down) Variable cost per hour (Table 2): $98.10 ($65.00 Cash and $33.10 reserves) At the “average” flight hours of 58 per year, this comes to $427 per hour (hangared) and $365 Per hour (tied down). Both being significantly higher than if a similar plane was being rented from the local airport.

Table 3

However, where the magic starts is as the total numbers of hours per year start to increase (Table 3): This table highlights some key information:

Five people owning the plane with each one using it for about 58 hours (292 hours) reduces the cost per hour by $264 (hangared) and $214 (tied down).
Fly 900 hours per year and the cost per hour falls to $119 (hangared) and $115 (tied down).
At 58 hours per year the recovery of fixed costs comes to $329 per hour (Hangared) and $266 (tied down).
At 292 hours the fixed costs make up $65 (hangared) $53 (tied down).
At 900 hours the fixed costs make up $21 (hangared) and $17 (tied down).
As the number of hours increases the differential between keeping the plane hangared and tied down reduces dramatically.
The rate of decrease in cost per hour slows down considerably as the total hours increase suggesting an optimum number of hours per year.
The clear lesson here is that higher volumes have the potential to turn an unaffordable luxury into something significantly more accessible and affordable. Consequently, when you look at these figures it is difficult to see why people would actually want to own any aircraft rather than rent, as all but the most frugal would save money. This also explains why the main cost saving model people have adopted is that of shared ownership through partnerships, flying clubs and managed ownership.

Typical responses given to this question might include:

The rental aircraft are just not available when I want to fly
I can’t go off on a long trip in a rental plane
They are not kept in good enough condition
Always down for some reason or another'
Too expensive
Does not have the type I like to fly
I like the freedom of making a spur of the moment decision
Planes get too much use, don’t trust the maintenance
Not enough of the model I like to fly
I never share anything
There are surely many more.

Some Typical Forms of Shared Ownership

Each of these solutions brings with it a different set of constraints. The biggest issues with partnerships come down to personality and attitude conflicts. It is very difficult to ensure that you get the right blend of people together who have shared values - anything broken will be fixed, aircraft will be kept clean with fuel after every trip etc. That is without even touching on the challenges of everybody wanting to fly at the same time and what happens when the plane is down for an extended annual, upgrades or repair. Flying clubs can bring more discipline to the whole concept of shared ownership/Shared use and even add the attraction of multiple aircraft but, with a multiplication of shared owners/users the potential for conflicts also multiply. There are some great examples of flying clubs that have been around for many decades. These tend to have more formal rules than partnerships but are usually set up as not for profit and are run by volunteers with a common interest so the ongoing quality of the experience can be highly variable over time. Professionally managed ownership got a significant boost about 18 years ago spurred on by the excitement generated by Cirrus which led to a number of fractional ownership programs being created and sold. However, these were being created as a way to sell more Cirrus aircraft and promoted by people looking to make very substantial profits from the programs. They ultimately failed because they did not really aim to bring costs down for the owners through volume and there were too few customers looking for such a high-end experience. Nevertheless, the concept did take off it many different forms for turbine aircraft where the costs of professional management are not a major obstacle to the high net worth individuals and companies who are customers as their alternatives could be even higher cost charter or sole ownership. Ultimately, the key takeaway from all of this is that volume is what brings down costs and makes aviation more affordable but, it does not necessarily address the challenges of accessibility. Accessibility only comes from there being a plentiful supply of aircraft, and organization to put the aircraft where the demand is. MOSAIC, the subject of a prior article that I wrote, has the potential to offer aircraft with much lower variable operating costs than legacy aircraft but, with potentially higher fixed costs as they would be newer and likely much better equipped. With high volumes bringing down the fixed costs per hour plus lower variable costs, the overall economics could well place new aircraft within the reach of many more people. The second article in this series will cover some of the potential solutions to accessibility to shared ownership/usage aircraft.

I was inspired to write this article by a comment made on a previous article I wrote on MOSAIC. I had indicated that MOSAIC had the potential to bring new aircraft to market at half the price of current legacy offerings. The commenter made the point that even at half the price, this would still not make it inherently “affordable” to most people. This topic will be covered in two articles. The first will discuss how shared ownership is able to bring down the costs of accessing an airplane and thus, making it potentially more affordable to a wider pilot demographic. The second article will detail two proposals on how some form of shared ownership could be expanded into a regional or national model. How the Numbers Add Up Affordability is really not a single quantifiable number that can be used to judge a product. There are simply too many other factors such as income, lifestyle and geographical location that have to be taken into account while, of course, no two people see their life priorities the same way.

MOSAIC – A Different Perspective

By Phil Solomon || June 20, 2024 12 Comments (Edit)

A lot has been written about the contents of the MOSAIC NPRM and many people and organizations have been able to comment on it to the FAA. Much of the commentary has been around the extension, or in some cases, curtailing of existing privileges for Sport Pilots, aircraft that can fit into the Light Sport definition and Light Sport Repairman certifications. I don’t plan to re-hash any of that here. This article will focus on what some of these changes could mean, in practical terms, to the market for Light Sport Aircraft and its customers. As you will see, it has the potential to be highly disruptive which not everyone will be happy about but will do so in a way that also opens up opportunities to a wider audience. Before delving any deeper, let's dispel the myth held by some in general aviation that Light Sport has been a “failure”. Yes, like pretty much any revolution, its first manifestations probably did not meet the hype, but it has indelibly changed the aviation landscape in positive ways for all aviators. I will briefly hit a few of these:

BasicMed would still be a twinkle in the eye of AOPA and others if the hard proof from Sport Pilots not dying en-masse and crashing into houses the moment their medicals expired had not provided the empirical evidence supporting the proposed relaxations.
Angle of attack indicators, glass panels, digital autopilots and other aids to safe flight and situational awareness came from the experimental market into the Light Sport market and proved very quickly that compulsory FAA approvals only served to delay and make less affordable, potentially lifesaving technologies. Major changes to Part 23 certification for small aircraft to allow them to conform with ASTM consensus standards came directly from the (largely) positive experiences from Light Sport aircraft that were being made to a consensus standard.
The number of pilots exercising Sport Pilot privileges far exceeds the number of Sport Pilot licenses issued because every expired medical creates a Light Sport eligible pilot. A very large percentage of pilots exercising Sport Pilot privileges fall into this category. Accident statistics clearly support the notion that expanding the range of potentially eligible planes would likely maintain Light Sport and Sport Pilot safety on the desired continuum of safety—between Experimental and fully certified.
As soon as BasicMed came along and had proven to be a success, the medical justification for keeping Light Sport aircraft within a somewhat arbitrary weight, equipment and performance envelope were no longer justifiable or sustainable, but it took the FAA a while to reach that same conclusion.

Having set the scene, this article is going to examine how some of these changes could play out from a fixed wing aircraft and pilot perspective.

Fate of Existing Light Sport-Eligible Aircraft

Many, but not all, of the current Light Sport specific aircraft (S-LSAs) could accommodate higher gross weights and have modifications that would give them adjustable propellers and higher speeds but there is some uncertainty as to whether this would be allowed under the final regulations and whether the current manufacturers would want/be able to make these changes. From a consumer perspective, the desirability of these options is very clear. However, some manufacturers might not have the capability to make these changes while others may see upgrades of existing planes as a detriment to future sales of new aircraft that do meet the new standards. The downside to manufacturers not giving an answer prior to the final regulations coming into effect could be a freezing of sales of current new and used aircraft. Some manufacturers have committed to providing an upgrade path for existing owners. As time moves on, we could see a divide in the market between those manufacturers who have committed and those who have either kept silent or specifically declined to offer upgrades.

Where things could become controversial, is what owners of E-LSAs (Experimental Light Sport) will, or won’t be able to do to modify their aircraft to take advantage of the expected expanded definition of a Light Sport aircraft. E-LSAs fall into two main types—those built from kits based on a model that has been shown to be S-LSA conforming and those that started life as an S-LSA but whose owners chose to re-register them as E-LSAs. Lets say that an S-LSA manufacturer opts to provide an upgrade path to a higher useful load for its existing models, could E-LSAs that either started life as the same make and model or those built from a kit follow suit? Well, the current E-LSA regulations might suggest not, as E-LSAs must be operated in accordance with the operating limitations issued to the aircraft at the time it receives its airworthiness certification. So, you could have the strange situation where Experimental aircraft are being held to a tighter standard than the one that is being applied to a higher level of aircraft. Basically, a reversal of the FAA concept of a continuum of safety. The NPRM does little to clarify any of this, but it would not be the first time that there has been this effective reversal of safety logic. Here’s another example. At the present time, a fully certified aircraft under Part 23 can run over engine TBO when operating under Part 91 but an S-LSA might not be able to, depending on the whim of the aircraft manufacturer. Many of the proposed changes are considered to be beneficial to safety, such as increased weight and controllable propellers, so why would it be in the general interest of safety to create a two-tier market?

About Legacy Aircraft

Something else to consider: How might the expansion of Light Sport definitions affect existing legacy aircraft that will now fall within the Light Sport Eligible category?

Let's start with a little history lesson. For liability reasons Cessna stopped producing light aircraft in 1986 and re-started production of the Cessna 172 in 1996 following the passage of the General Aviation Revitalization Act, making its first shipments in 1997 at a “typically equipped” price of around $136,000. Fast forward 28 years, and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, tells us that the Consumer Price Index has increased by a factor of 1.97 times. So, if all things were equal, which they never are, the same plane would be selling at $267,920 today. It is not easy to find an exact current list price, but full retail is in the region of $650,000 or 4.8 times the 1997 price. Yes, the 2024 plane would come with an incredible suite of avionics in the form of the Garmin G1000 that would command a premium price but it has basically the same engine and airframe as before. Here is where things get interesting. Part 23 certification can act as a two-way barrier by protecting legacy aircraft manufacturers that have amortized their investments many times over due to the ultra slow/no pace of technological advances in legacy engines while limiting new entrants to the four-seat certified market because of the costs of entry. The Cessna 172 has effectively set the price expectation for training aircraft which has then increased the profitability and attractiveness for other companies as well such as Piper, Cirrus, Diamond and Tecnam who are able to price at similarly elevated levels due to shortage of capacity and high flight school demand. Product pricing can certainly come from a formula that starts with costs and adds a margin, but in the case of a protected market (which is what certification does) pricing can be whatever the market will bear. MOSAIC potentially lowers both the barriers and the cost of entry for new four-seat aircraft as they can be manufactured to an agreed standard and use components that have not, themselves, had to go through very expensive certifications. With many traditional legal design burdens lifted, we can reasonably expect to see new aircraft that are lighter but potentially stronger than their legacy colleagues, full of avionics that are a fraction of the cost of the fully certified versions and with engines that are more efficient, use less expensive fuels and weigh less. It is certainly possible that new entrants will simply follow existing pricing trends, but given volume opportunities and the need to break into a very restricted, brand-conscious market, they are more likely to seek market share through price and features. Most flight schools cannot afford brand new aircraft from any of the current market leaders because a new plane offers no discernible operating cost advantages over the same model that is 20 or more years old, and any ability to price at a premium for new versus old is negligible.

UND's training fleet is underwritten by school tuition, something that smaller flight schools can't bring to bear.

The new aircraft market for training aircraft is currently limited to a very few, very large flight schools who are often part of a college program so can cross subsidize through tuition fees for academic courses. New, four seat Light Sport aircraft built to the new ASTM Light Sport standards could easily be sold profitably for half of the price of a legacy aircraft while offering engines that could decimate operating costs and avionics that are at least comparable, if not better, in functionality and ease of use. Taking the Cessna 172 as an example, this plane would now be Light Sport eligible but still constrained by certification limitations and a price that could be double that of new competition. Is that a sustainable position? Only time will tell but the legacy models could potentially be re-tooled and equipped in line with ASTM standards and relaunched as a Light Sport. This would bring certain costs down but require new investment in manufacturing practices which may leave the net costs of production unchanged but pricing at a potentially much lower level in line with new generation Light Sports.

How Will MOSAIC Influence Flight Training?

The answer is probably in multiple parts. The first, and immediate, answer is that it will boost the attraction of holding a Sport Pilot license or exercising Sport Pilot privileges. The vast majority of flight schools and rental fleets do not offer any Light Sport aircraft for rent and do not see the benefits of having multiple training options just to cater for this audience. With existing aircraft in the fleet becoming Light Sport eligible, schools could well see a fast expansion in Sport Pilot training and rentals. Existing Sport Pilots who downgraded from full private and above certifications will get rapid check outs in legacy aircraft and owners who had previously needed to sell aircraft because they did not feel comfortable with full medical renewals or BasicMed, will likely keep them. The possible downside of this could be a further restriction on the supply of affordable used aircraft as owners choose to retain them plus more people looking to rent. Secondly, for others, the Sport Pilot license would become a more affordable and accessible option to get into flying as more airports would now have planes they could fly once they achieved their Sport Pilot Certification. However, there is a certain stigma still attached to both Light Sport Aircraft and Sport Pilots probably due to lack of understanding and some of the myths discussed above.

Thirdly, and potentially most importantly, this would be an opportunity to expand the pilot population and increase the proportion of successful completions from the 20-30% (for a Private Pilot License) highlighted in AOPA’s 2010 study to something significantly higher. With a Sport Pilot license theoretically achievable in 20 hours compared to 40 for a Private Pilot License it could and perhaps should be the starting point for all aspiring pilots. However, there are barriers to this including the current lack of Light Sport aircraft in flight schools and the need to take another written test and check ride to move up from Sport to Private. The former will change almost overnight with the publication of the final regulations following the NPRM but the latter is not impacted by MOSAIC. However, this would open up one of MOSAICS many opportunities for productive change. At the present time the content of a Sport Pilot check ride and Private Pilot check ride is effectively the same with no difference in expected performance or maneuvers. The oral exam would have some differences concerning limitations and privileges that come with the certification. Currently a Sport Pilot could, through experience and with an instructor, gradually add-on the capabilities and training that would be required for Private Pilot privileges—3 hours of instrument training, 3 hours of night, airspace clearance, towered landings and additional solo time. Ironically, none of these “add-ons” are actually specifically tested during a second flight test for Private Pilot beyond what had already taken place under the original Sport Pilot check ride. Consequently, a Sport Pilot moving to Private Pilot is being tested twice for the same skills with the same performance requirements but having to pay for both an extra written test and flight test. Not surprisingly, this acts as a disincentive for people to start with the more affordable and swifter option of a Sport Pilot license if their ultimate goal is to add ratings later. The obvious solution to this would be to make Sport Pilot the starting point for all aviation certifications with a formal DPE conducted check ride and then gradually move up to Private Pilot through adding endorsements with one CFI and a final endorsement from a different one, as is currently allowed for moves between Light Sport Categories. The endorsements would cover both knowledge and flight skills/experience. This would increase the number of pilots who are able to complete something and give them the incentive to continue to add skills and experience knowing that there is not another massive expense waiting for them to be able to move up. As with many aspects of the Light Sport/Sport Pilot revolution, the success of this low-risk modification could also provide data for whether non DPE instructors can be relied upon to safely transition these pilots. In conclusion, MOSAIC is going to have a major positive effect on aviation accessibility and affordability but not just because of the obvious changes but also from its direct consequences on related matters that might not, at first sight, even be in play.

A lot has been written about the contents of the MOSAIC NPRM and many people and organizations have been able to comment on it to the FAA. Much of the commentary has been around the extension, or in some cases, curtailing of existing privileges for Sport Pilots, aircraft that can fit into the Light Sport definition and Light Sport Repairman certifications. I don’t plan to re-hash any of that here. This article will focus on what some of these changes could mean, in practical terms, to the market for Light Sport Aircraft and its customers. As you will see, it has the potential to be highly disruptive which not everyone will be happy about but will do so in a way that also opens up opportunities to a wider audience. Before delving any deeper, let’s dispel the myth held by some in general aviation that Light Sport has been a “failure”.